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Abstract—Most work on adaptive workflows offers insuffi-
cient flexibility to enforce complex policies regarding dynamic,
evolvable and robust workflows. In addition, many proposed
approaches require customized workflow engines. This paper
presents a portable framework for realistic enforcement of dy-
namic adaptation policies in business processes. The framework is
based on the Model-View-Controller (MVC) pattern, commonly
used for adding dynamism to web pages. To enhance reusability,
our approach supports separation of adaptation logic from the
functional workflow and modularization of workflow tasks in
reusable aspects. The main idea is to design a workflow process
as a template, where tasks can be specified on an abstract
level. Concrete implementations of the tasks, modeled as aspects,
are then selected from a library according to a policy-based
adaptation logic. This logic is implemented using a general
purpose language that offers an extensible and flexible solution
to enforce any type of policy. We evaluate by means of a case
study on workflow confidentiality to what extent an approach
using standards-based technologies allows application-specific
adaptation of running workflow instances.
Keywords-service composition; policy-based adaptation; model-
view-controller; confidentiality; WS-BPEL
I. INTRODUCTION
Workflow languages focus on combining web services into
aggregate services. At this moment, the Web Services Business
Process Execution Language (WS-BPEL) [1] has profiled
itself as the de-facto industry standard for orchestrating web
services. However, this standard exhibits major limitations
regarding reusability and flexibility as discussed in several
works [2], [3], [4], [5], [6].
A workflow describes a sequence of tasks. Each task
represents a coherent set of activities that fulfill a specific
functionality. Tasks can be delegated to services and may
require human interaction. Most workflow languages assume
that the tasks are executed in a static context. However,
workflow environments are often dynamic. For example, ser-
vices can become unavailable, unexpected faults may occur
or participating partners in the workflow may not be known
upfront, before some tasks are actually executed. Workflow
confidentiality is another often recurring requirement that
illustrates the need for dynamic adaptation in composite web
services. Confidentiality requirements include the enforcement
of access control related constraints. For example, a Separation
of Duty (SoD) constraint demands that two specific tasks from
a workflow are performed by two different users. The identity
of the users is usually only known during the execution of
the workflow instance. Therefore, dynamic adaptation of the
workflow is required to make sure that the second task is
performed by a different user than the first. Adaptation of the
workflow to the dynamic environment is a different concern
than its functional description and thus ideally should be spec-
ified separately. Policies can specify how the workflow must
behave in a dynamic context. An adaptation policy could state
that when a service responsible for a particular task is down,
another service providing similar functionality must be used
instead. Enforcement of such policies in a functional workflow
description results in scattered and tangled descriptions, or
may be even impossible to realize.
We identify four important requirements for a realistic
solution to dynamic workflow adaptation. First, it is desired
that the adaptation policies can be modeled separately from
the functional requirements to avoid overly complicated work-
flows. Separation of concerns also promotes the reusability of
existing solutions. Second, we want an extensible solution,
offering sufficient flexibility to implement complex policies
that transcend the possibilities offered by traditional workflow
languages. Third, our solution must be portable between
existing workflow engine implementations without invasive
modifications. Fourth, to foster robust workflows it must be
possible to properly handle policies similar to the SoD policy
described earlier. Ideally, application-specific adaptation is
needed at run-time to orchestrate tasks to users that satisfy
the policy. This information is usually only known during the
execution of the workflow instance, which means that support
for adaptation of running web service compositions is required
to avoid failing workflows.
In this paper, we propose a Model-View-Controller frame-
work for policy-based adaptation of workflow processes and
show that it supports the four requirements discussed above.
The framework treats workflow specifications in a similar
way to dynamic web pages, where page content is generated
according to the user provided information. Workflows are
then tailored from customizable aspects, which represent a
coherent set of WS-BPEL activities fulfilling a specific task.
The framework supports both deploy- and run-time adaptation
of a workflow process. Moreover, in this paper we evaluate
by means of a case study on confidentiality to what extent
an approach using standards-based technologies allows us to
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realize policy-based adaptation and discuss the advantages and
disadvantages compared to other approaches.
This paper is structured as follows. Section II introduces
the terminology and concepts of confidentiality policies and
presents a concrete workflow to illustrate some of the con-
fidentiality policies. Section III presents an overview of the
proposed MVC framework and shows how it is realized using
standards-based technologies. Section IV illustrates how the
framework is used to enforce workflow confidentiality; it
motivates the need for workflow adaptation at both deploy-
and run-time and illustrates how the framework supports both
adaptation strategies. Section V discusses the MVC framework
and gives an overview of related work. Finally, section VI
concludes the paper.
II. A CASE STUDY ON CONFIDENTIALITY
This section presents a case study on workflow confidential-
ity. In the first subsection we define the main concepts behind
confidentiality. Next, we present an e-health related workflow
and its confidentiality requirements.
A. Confidentiality Considerations
Confidentiality has been extensively studied in recent years.
An important aspect of confidentiality is controlling access
to the resources that contain sensitive information. However,
as pointed out by Hammer and Schneider [7], the definition
of confidentiality also needs a notion of information flow in
order to be complete. In other words, preserving confidentiality
requires: 1) ensuring that information is only accessible to
subjects entitled to it, which can be achieved with access
control and encryption mechanisms, and 2) controlling the
information flow according to the confidentiality policies
to ensure that subjects cannot have unpermitted access to
information due to its flow.
A workflow consists of a sequence of connected tasks. We
define a task as a coherent set of activities fulfilling a specific
functionality. A task is executed in the workflow itself or is
delegated to a user or organization by a service invocation.
Fig. 1. RBAC Model
For access control purposes we use the RBAC model. It is a
frequently used model for controlling access in the context of
workflows. More in particular, we assume the model shown
in figure 1. This model relates the concepts of organizations,
workflows, (delegated) tasks, users, roles and permissions.
Users work for an organization. They can have assigned roles
and perform tasks when permitted. We extend this model with
two types of access control constraints: the Separation of
Duty (SoD) and Binding of Duty (BoD). For example, we
can specify that when task x is performed by a user from
organization A, task y also has to be performed by a user from
organization A (BoD). Alternatively, we can specify that tasks
x and y have to be performed by two different users (SoD).
Tasks are executed within an organization. The organization
hosting the workflow can execute tasks itself or delegate them
to other organizations or users. Delegating a task usually
requires an information flow. An example violation of an in-
formation flow policy is when confidential information reaches
an organization and is read by a user with a permitted role,
however a policy specifies that this information should not be
accessible to users affiliated with this organization. In order
to enforce information flow policies, our model specifies the
assignment of permissions to organizations. A user executing
a delegated task needs to have a permitted role and needs
to be affiliated with a permitted organization. Tasks that do
not involve users only require a permitted organization. Other
types of information flow policies usually state constraints on
where the information can be stored, over which channels it
can be transferred, through which points it can be transferred,
Fig. 2. Example E-Health workflow process
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or where it can be viewed. In the context of workflows, the
enforcement of these types of policies can usually be reduced
to verifying if a particular workflow does not violate these
policies, before deploying the workflow.
B. Running Example: An E-Health Workflow
This section presents a case study situated in the health
care environment. The case study consists of a workflow that
realizes a mammography screening program, initiated by the
government, in order to reduce breast cancer mortality by early
detection for women above a certain age. The workflow is
illustrated in Figure 2.
The first task of the workflow consists of sending out
invitations to all women that qualify for the program to let
a radiologist take images needed for the screening. Once
images are taken, the radiologist uploads them to the system
(task 2). A prevention of acquiring sensitive information
constraint on this result is necessary to avoid a reading of
personal information by unentitled persons. Afterwards, the
readings can be performed for the particular screening subject.
A BoD constraint regulates the requirement of assigning
participating screening centers. When Task 2 is performed by
a radiologist from a specific center (which is not known before
the execution, i.e., the screening subject is free to choose
the radiology center), the readings have to be performed by
the screening center of the corresponding zone (geographical
location). This is marked on figure 2 with a dashed rectangle
encapsulating tasks 2 and 3. This constraint is also an example
of an information flow policy on the organizational level, i.e.,
the involved information may not be accessed in screening
centers other than the corresponding one. There are always
two independent readings, represented by tasks 3 and 4. In
a next step, the two results of the readings are compared.
When the results are identical, there is little doubt that the
two physicians made the same mistake. Therefore it can be
safely assumed that results are correct and the workflow can
proceed with task 5. However, when the results are different,
a concluding reading is performed (task 4’). A SoD constraint
implies that in order to be effective, tasks 3, 4 and 4’ need
to be performed by different physicians within the screening
center (dashed line encapsulating tasks 3, 4 and 4’). Once the
results of the screening of a particular screening subject are
formulated, a report is generated (task 5) and different parties
are billed (task 6). Finally, a report is sent to the screening
subject and her general practitioner (task 7).
III. A MVC FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY-BASED
ADAPTATION
In this section we present a framework that allows the
adaptation of WS-BPEL processes in a dynamic and modular
way. The idea is based on similar evolutions in the domain of
web design. The intent of web design is to create a website that
presents the content to the end users in the form of web pages.
To comply with today’s expectations of end-users, there is a
growing tendency to use dynamic web pages. In contrast to
static pages, where the content and layout is not changed with
Fig. 3. Framework: Overview
every request, dynamic pages adapt their content on the fly
depending on the user’s input. We map this concept of dynamic
web design to web service composition. The proposed solution
is based on the ”Model-View-Controller” (MVC) concept.
Section III-A gives a high-level overview of the framework
and section III-B shows how we implemented a prototype
using standards-based technologies.
A. Overview
An overview of our framework is illustrated in figure 3.
The framework generates a workflow process according to the
adaptation logic specified in the controller component. The
resulting process is a standard WS-BPEL process, deployable
on existing WS-BPEL engines. Dynamic adaptation of running
instances is done according to run-time adaptation logic, for
example, based on the execution history of a running instance.
During execution, the process instance feeds back to the
framework to report its progress. The controller can then
decide if adaptation is required. In the context of dynamic web
pages, this approach is similar to generating web content based
on the user’s input. In this analogy, the XML representation
of the workflow process can be interpreted as web content.
We discuss the main building blocks of the framework:
the master process, the controller and the data model. More
details and concrete examples are shown in section IV, where
the framework is used to enforce workflow confidentiality.
1) Model: The model includes the aspect library, the
policy- and instance-related data. The library contains aspects
for the different WS-BPEL activities that can be modularized
as a specific task. All these concrete implementations of a
task are bundled in the library and can be reused across
workflows. An aspect definition represents a coherent set
of basic and structured WS-BPEL activities that realize a
particular functionality. Policy-related data specifies properties
or parameter values that can be used to evaluate adaptation
policies. An example property is the workload of services
participating in a particular workflow. Dynamic adaptation of
running instances can also depend on instance-related data.
This data includes the current value of variables used in a
specific workflow and its current executing activity.
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2) View (Master Process): With the aspect library in
mind, a master process can be created. Instead of including
all specific implementation details, it is designed as a
template. The process is designed like a regular process and
specifies the sequence of tasks that need to be executed.
When the concrete implementation of a task depends on
certain constraints, then only a general reference to the type
of the task is included. Binding a concrete aspect to the task
reference is done later by the controller according to the
adaptation logic.
3) Controller: The controller contains the logic to decide
which aspects are substituted in the master process, i.e. it
implements the adaptation policies that depend on the infor-
mation available through the model. The adaptation policies
define a set of context-free and context-sensitive constraints on
the specific task implementations that constitute the workflow
process. Context-free constraints, where the policy evaluation
is done using attributes that are not dependent on the state
of the workflow instance, are enforced before deployment
using policy-related data. Context sensitive constraints, which
require information on the context of the running workflow
instance, are enforced at run-time with dynamic adaptation
mechanisms using additional instance-related data.
B. Prototype Implementation & Used Technologies
Fig. 4. Prototype implementation
We used standards-based technologies to build a prototype
of the framework. The implementation is done on top of
the sun-bpel-engine, a component of the Open Enterprise
Service Bus. OpenEsb is a Java based open source enterprise
service bus. Figure 4 gives a high level overview of how we
implemented a dynamic WS-BPEL layer on top of the existing
WS-BPEL component framework. The MVC framework we
used for the implementation is the ”Ruby On Rails (RoR)”
framework [8], known for adding dynamism to web pages.
A first step to get a WS-BPEL process up and running
in OpenESB is to design the process in a WS-BPEL editor.
Once the process is ready, the WS-BPEL module needs to be
added to a composite application. The resulting application
is packaged as a service assembly and can be deployed and
executed on a domain of the application server. The service
assembly is copied to the corresponding domain directory
on deployment. When a create-instance is triggered by an
incoming message, a new running instance will be created
on the WS-BPEL engine according to the process description
of the WS-BPEL process that was included in the service
assembly. The persistence option, which is included in almost
every existing WS-BPEL engine implementation, forces the
process instance to save its state in the persistence database
on crucial points (e.g. after each invoke activity) during its
execution.
Our dynamic WS-BPEL layer (top layer in figure 4) inter-
acts with the existing layer through 3 different interfaces. The
first allows us to change the WS-BPEL process description
within the service assembly. New process instances will be
created according to the new description after it is changed.
It can be considered as a template from which instances are
created. The second interface includes the JAVA CAPS library.
Java CAPS stands for Java Composite Application Platform
Suite and is composed of several packages that allows to inter-
act with the components of the underlying SOA infrastructure.
We use it to interact with the sun-bpel-component. It allows us
to restart the engine, recovering workflow instances, etc. The
third interface allows us to manipulate the persistence data of
running instances. The most straightforward way is to use the
model from the RoR framework: tables are mapped on ruby
objects which can be manipulated and saved to the database
from within Ruby.
Using these insights, we now explain how the dynamic WS-
BPEL layer allows us to enforce context-sensitive policies.
After a policy sensitive task, the workflow instance feeds back
its identifier and the policy rule that must be evaluated using
a synchronous invoke on the RoR backend web service. The
MVC backend contacts the controller to check for the policy
rule for that specific instance. Instance-related data can be
retrieved from the persistence database using the RoR model.
When a policy rule is not satisfied, the current process can be
adapted and rolled back to a previous state. Roll-back is done
by changing the last checkpoint in the persistence database
(using RoR model) and forcing the instance to restore its
state (using the CAPS library). The process is adapted by
substituting other aspects in the master process and changing
the WS-BPEL description in the service assembly. This allows
us to dynamically change the future course of the process
instance after a forced recovery when it is required by the
policy rule.
IV. USING THE FRAMEWORK TO ENFORCE WORKFLOW
CONFIDENTIALITY
In this section we illustrate how the framework is used to
enforce workflow confidentiality in the context of our case
study. First, we illustrate example implementations for the
building blocks, introduced in section III-A. These building
blocks are the main ingredients for the deploy- and run-time
adaptation strategies presented next.
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1 <a s p e c t name=” S c r e e n i n g S e r v i c e ( Var message ) ”
2 r e s u l t =” Var s t a t u s ”>
3 <module>
4 . . .
5 <i n vo ke p a r t n e r L i n k =” S r e e n i n g S e r v ”
6 p o r t T y p e =” ps : sc reenPT ” o p e r a t i o n =” s e n t ”
7 i n p u t V a r i a b l e =” message ” o u t p u t V a r i a b l e =” s t a t u s ”>
8 </module>
9 </ a s p e c t>
Listing 1. Example aspect definition
1 <p r o c e s s>
2 . . .
3 <%= p o s t S e r v i c e ( $ P s O p e r a t i o n I n . r e q u e s t ) %>
4 <s e q u e n c e name=” Sequence1”>
5 <%= r a d i o l o g y S e r v i c e ( $ R a d O p e r a t i o n I n . Reques t ) %>
6 <%= s c r e e n i n g S e r v i c e ( $ S c r e e n O p e r a t i o n I n . r e q u e s t ) %>
7 . . .
8 </ sequence>
9 </ scope>
10 . . .
11 </ p r o c e s s>
Listing 2. Fragment of master process
1 module e h e a l t h S e r v i c e
2 def p o s t S e r v i c e ( o r d e r )
3 i n t workloadP1 = Model . ge tWorkloadP1 ( )
4 i n t workloadP2 = Model . ge tWorkloadP2 ( )
5 i f ( workloadP1 < workloadP2 )
6 re turn a s p e c t s . p1 ( o r d e r )
7 e l s e
8 re turn a s p e c t s . p2 ( o r d e r )
9 end
10 end
11 def s c r e e n i n g S e r v i c e ( r e q u e s t )
12 i f ( Model . ge tZone ( ) == Leuven )
13 re turn a s p e c t s . s2 ( r e q u e s t )
14 end
15 . . .
16 end
Listing 3. Fragment of controller
A. Illustration of the MVC Building Blocks
An organization that hosts a workflow process can have
different contacts to delegate a specific task. For example,
there are different post services that can be contacted to
handle the invitations for a screening. Also different screening
centers are able to interpret a mammography of a radiology
service. Services can perform the same kind of task, but
have different WSDL-interfaces. This means that the workflow
implementation will be slightly different for different workflow
participants. Aspects can modularize these differences.
Listing 1 shows an aspect definition that allows the invoca-
tion of a screening center. The syntax used for defining aspects
is based on an existing syntax for describing WS-BPEL
modules [3]. A module is a cluster of WS-BPEL activities.
Different modules are used when the contained activities that
realize the functionality provided by the aspect are scattered
throughout the process. Further, listings 2 and 3 show example
fragments of the master process and the controller logic
respectively. The master process contains regular WS-BPEL
activities and parameterizable references to controller methods
that implement the adaptation logic. This logic selects aspects
that are substituted in the master process.
B. A Deploy- and Run-time Adaptation Strategy
Our motivation for the fact that some confidentiality con-
straints are ideally enforced at deployment time, while others
need to be enforced at run-time is based on assumptions
that can be made about the workflow participants. In WS-
BPEL, communication with services of organizations or users
can be done in a synchronous or asynchronous way. In the
case of synchronous communication, a response comes from
the same location as the request. If we presume that the
location of the endpoint characterizes the identity of the
organization or the user, then it is possible to identify the
participants of the workflow process before execution. Lower
layer security protocols (e.g. SSL) can be used to avoid
tampering. However, with asynchronous communication, the
response can come from another entity to the one the request
was sent to. Matching between request and response can be
done using correlation sets. The responder only needs to know
the correlation identifier so that the response message can be
matched to the corresponding process instance. In this case the
workflow needs to authenticate this entity first to determine its
role. Policy enforcement can thus only be done at run-time.
Fig. 5. Deploy-time Adaptation
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In the following subsections we present both the simplified
case where synchronous communication is used, i.e. the
participants of the process can be identified at deployment-
time, and the extended case, where run-time identification of
the participants is required.
1) Deploy-time Enforcement: Our goal is to optimize
aspect allocation at deployment time, compliant with the
context-free policies. Figure 5 shows the different steps of
the adaptation process: (1) The controller can be triggered to
(re)generate the process. Ideally this is done right before an
incoming message triggers the creation of a workflow instance.
(2a) The controller interprets partner information and other
policy-related data and (2b) selects the corresponding aspect
from the library (2) which are then integrated in the master
process. (3) The result is a specific executable WS-BPEL
process generated by the controller.
We can apply this approach to enforce some aspects of
confidentiality at deployment time, presuming the simplified
case of synchronous communication where an endpoint of
an invoke activity characterizes its identity. A task allocation
can be done using adaptation logic that determines the best
aspect configuration according to the policies. In listing 3
we showed how BoD is enforced by selecting the aspect
that invokes the screening center that corresponds to the
same zone as the radiology service that is used in the
workflow. Analog, the SoD requirement can be achieved
by selecting aspects invoking endpoints corresponding to
different physicians within the same screening center. The
prevention of acquiring sensitive information constraint
and the information flow policy is also implicitly enforced
because of the deterministic identity assumptions.
2) Run-time Enforcement: The enforcement of complex
access control policies in a more restricted setting, i.e. we do
not trust the participating partners, will furthermore require
the framework to interpret the access history of objects during
execution of an instance of the process.
Figure 6 illustrates how the framework is used to enforce
run-time constraints on the e-health workflow. In a first stage,
deploy-time adaptation is used to generate an optimal scenario
compliant with the context-free constraints (Process Instance
1a). For example, aspect P1 is used to contact the post service
to send the invitations. Next, the radiology center, related
to aspect R1, sends the result of a screening. Because no
assumptions are made about the identity of the endpoint,
the use of an authentication mechanism is appropriate. This
requires the screening center to authenticate with an identity
provider. By appending its proof of identity to the response
message, it can be fed back to the MVC framework for
validation. Based on this information, together with the history
of the process, the MVC framework can regenerate the process
instance to be compliant with the context-sensitive constraints.
In our case study, there is a BoD between task 2 and task 3
and a SoD between task 2, 3 and 4. The initial generated
process uses an aspect to contact screening center 2. This
is compliant with the constraint policy. So after successful
validation of the identity of the response endpoint by the
controller, the MVC framework concludes that no regeneration
of the process instance is necessary. When the response comes
from an unauthorized identity, the instance can be reinitialized
on the previous task. The feedback is repeated for the next
task, which specifies that a second opinion on the radiology
result is required. To enforce the context-sensitive SoD, a new
process instance is generated (Process Instance 1b), using an
aspect to contact screening center 3. The new process instance
is initialized on this task and contains the process variables
that were set during previous activities. Again, after successful
validation of the identity, it seems that both opinions are
consistent and therefore task 5 is not required. A new process
instance is generated (Process Instance 1c). This instance is
not bound to any constraints and can end the workflow.
Fig. 6. Run-time Adaptation
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Since no assumptions are made concerning the identity of
the endpoint, the prevention of acquiring sensitive informa-
tion and the information flow policy requires that sensitive
information cannot be read by or sent to an unpermitted
subject. This restriction can be solved by changing the as-
pect responsible for contacting a screening center: with a
first invocation, the permitted screening center is contacted
without adding the mammography result. The screening center
responds with a certificate containing its identification and
its public key. In a second iteration, the center is sent the
mammography result, encrypted with his public key. This
implies that only the permitted screening center is able to
process the sensitive data by decrypting it using its private key.
V. RELATED WORK & DISCUSSION
Fig. 7. Recommendation Service: Architectural Overview
Figure 7 illustrates possible stages involved in designing
and executing a constrained workflow. Based on this figure we
discuss our approach and elaborate on related work that is done
in these different stages. A complete and user-friendly solution
requires a combination of work done in the different stages.
Business Processes are designed according to the functional
requirements. Security constraints are usually modeled sepa-
rately (Fig. 7: (1)). In the area of security constraint modeling,
a lot of work is done on the expression of application security
in general. However, specific research in the domain of speci-
fying task-based authorization constraints for workflow models
is rather limited. Bertino [10] addresses the expression and
evaluation of access control constraints with two formal lan-
guages (1c). The first language, RBAC-WS-BPEL, is specified
using the RBAC profile of the XACML policy language and
extends the WS-BPEL language with support for the specifi-
cation of authorization information, associated with a business
process specified in WS-BPEL. The second is the BPCL
language (Business Process Constraint Language) that allows
for the description of authorization constraints. In ”Modeling
of Task-Based Authorization Constraints in BPMN [13]” a
graphical approach (1b) is presented. They propose a method
to define authorization constraints with a graphical notation
language within the Business Process Modeling Notation. The
work in the area of constraint modeling is complementary
to our work. In our approach, a master process is annotated
(1a) with references to the controller. The annotations connect
the adaptation logic to specific enforcement points in the
workflow, but do not focus on the modeling of constraints.
Mapping policies, specified using policy languages to the
framework is an interesting track for future work.
In the area of constraint reasoning (2), Hewett [14] proposes
practical computational techniques for analyzing SoD with
workflows. They present algorithms for generating mutually
exclusive roles to enforce SoD and to check if a given RBAC
state satisfies a given type of SoD constraint. In our approach,
the decision (adaptation) logic is implemented in the controller
using a general purpose language. This makes it possible
to enforce complex policies that transcend the possibilities
offered by the workflow languages, for example, to validate an
assertion to reveal an identity. This also allows easy extension
of the framework to support any type of the non-functional
requirement. For example, load balancing can be done by
dynamically changing participating partners in the process.
Advanced exception handling and self-healing is possible
by changing the process descriptor and recovering process
instances according to the new description when faults have
occurred.
The main focus of this paper is situated in deploy-time (3a)
and run-time (3b) policy enforcement. Related work on the
first is done by Hwang [15], who proposes a web service
selection approach that chooses a performer for each task in
the workflow to satisfy all access control constraints and to
increase the chance of completing the entire process in the
future. As illustrated in section IV-B1 our approach supports
deploy-time policy enforcement. The main advantage is that
it introduces no run-time overhead.
We found little related work on practical solutions for
the enforcement of access control during the execution of
a workflow process (3b). Bertino [10] proposes an XACML
based architecture, which manages the execution of business
processes subject to the authorization policy and constraints.
Access control is realized by intercepting incoming messages
of the workflow process. However, it is not clear to what
extent the policy decision point has access to the history of the
executing process to allow enforcement of context-sensitive
constraints. Runtime modification of the executing process is
also not possible. A similar approach is done by Wang [17].
A limitation of most existing approaches of adaptive web
service compositions, as discussed by Charfi et al. [19], is
the tight coupling of the adaptation logic with the execu-
tion logic inside the engine implementation. Therefore, the
adaptation logic cannot be extended by a third-party. Also,
most current approaches do not support dynamic adaptation of
running instances or application-specific adaptation features.
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Charfi [19] used the dynamic aspect-oriented workflow lan-
guage AO4BPEL to implement a plug-in architecture for self-
adaptive web service composition. Similar to our approach, it
supports application specific adaptation scenarios and allows
adaptation of running instances by using monitoring and adap-
tation aspects. The adaptation logic, expressed in AO4BPEL, is
weaved in the workflow itself. We use a separate, more flexible
general purpose language to express the adaptation logic.
Instead of using an aspect-aware workflow engine, we use
standards-based technologies to make our approach portable
to existing workflow engines. Our prototype shows that the
dynamic WS-BPEL layer is hardly dependent on the underly-
ing engine implementation. Deploy-time adaptation has no de-
pendency on the WS-BPEL engine. With run-time adaptation,
the dynamic WS-BPEL layer has a minimal interaction with
the underlying layer through the three interfaces discussed in
section III-B.
Adding extra dynamism also has a cost. All different
stages can introduce unexpected behavior. When aspects are
substituted in the master process, WS-BPEL processes can
easily become inconsistent. Changing persistent data must also
be done carefully to allow successful recovery. A process
description cannot be changed before the running state of
the instance, otherwise process recovery is not possible since
stored variables cannot be matched with the new process
descriptor. A feasible approach requires control mechanisms
to check for inconsistent behavior.
Another drawback is performance overhead. Introducing
feedbacks in the process, enabling workflow persistence and
adapting instances slows down the execution time. This over-
head is negligible for long-running process instances that
can exist for several days, weeks or even months. For real-
time processes we advice to use the static approach where
policy checking is only done at deployment time and thus no
run-time delays are introduced. On the other hand, dynamic
adaptation can also improve performance. There is a gain as
workflows are not interrupted or need to start all over because
of unexpected behavior.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented a Model-View-Controller
framework that allows policy-based adaptation of WS-BPEL
processes. Based on the properties of the environment and
the running workflow instances (Model) this framework can
dynamically adapt a workflow instance. A workflow is de-
signed as a master process which represents a template where
tasks can be specified on an abstract level (View). Concrete
implementations, modelled as aspects, are then selected by
the adaptation logic according to the policy (Controller).
Our framework, realized using standards-based technologies,
supports modularization of tasks in reusable aspects, has
flexibility to support complex policies as the enforcement logic
is implemented in a general purpose language, is portable to
different execution environments as it is independent from
the workflow language, and it allows the design of robust
workflows as they can be adapted and rolled-back.
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